Local Planning Appeal Tribunal
Tribunal d'appel de l'aménagement local

ISSUE DATE: April 16, 2019 **CASE NO(S).:** PL180842

The Ontario Municipal Board (the "OMB") is continued under the name Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (the "Tribunal"), and any reference to the Ontario Municipal Board or Board in any publication of the Tribunal is deemed to be a reference to the Tribunal.

PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 17(24) of the *Planning Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, as amended

Appellant:	386823 Ontario Limited
Appellant:	CAMPP Windsor Essex Residents Association
Appellant:	Fanelli Real Estate (South Airport Lands) Limited Partnership
Subject:	Proposed Official Plan Amendment No. 120
Municipality:	City of Windsor
LPAT Case No.:	PL180842
LPAT File No.:	PL180842
LPAT Case Name:	CAMPP Windsor Essex Residents Association v. Windsor (City)

PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 34(19) of the *Planning Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, as amended

Appellant:	CAMPP Windsor Essex Residents Association
Subject:	By-law No. 132-2018
Municipality:	City of Windsor
LPAT Case No.:	PL180842
LPAT File No.:	PL180843

Heard: March 20, 2019 in Windsor, Ontario

APPEARANCES:

Parties	**Counsel**
CAMPP Windsor Essex Residents Association (“CAMPP”)	E. Gillespie I. Flett
386823 Ontario Limited (“386”)	P. McCullough
Fanelli Real Estate (South Airport Lands) (“Fanelli”)	J. Hewitt
City of Windsor (the “City”)	P. Gross W. Vendrasco
Windsor Regional Hospital (“WRH”)	M. Bull K. Mullin

DECISION DELIVERED BY S. JACOBS, K.J. HUSSEY, AND S. TOUSAW AND ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL

INTRODUCTION

[1] The City of Windsor has adopted the County Road 42 Secondary Plan, consisting of a mix of institutional, employment, and residential uses all located south of Windsor International Airport and west of the Town of Tecumseh. This secondary planning process was prompted by Windsor Regional Hospital’s desire to develop a new regional hospital at County Road 42 and Concession 9. The City adopted Official Plan Amendment 120 (“OPA 120”) to implement the secondary plan, and also passed Zoning By-law Amendment 132-2018 (the “ZBA”) to establish the necessary zoning for the hospital site.

[2] CAMPP, 386, and Fanelli appealed the City’s adoption of OPA 120 pursuant to s. 17(36) of the *Planning Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 13, as amended (the “*Planning Act*”), and CAMPP also appealed the City’s passing of the ZBA pursuant to s. 34(19). The Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) convened this mandatory Case Management Conference (“CMC”) to deal with certain matters relating to the organization of these appeals for a hearing.

[3] Appeals under s. 17(36) and s. 34(19) of the *Planning Act* are subject to the practices and procedures established in the *Local Planning Appeal Tribunal Act, 2017*, S.O. 2017, c. 23, Sched. 1, as amended ("*LPATA*") due to legislative amendments implemented through *Bill 139, Building Better Communities and Conserving Watersheds Act, 2017* ("*Bill 139*"). Section 39 of *LPATA* requires the Tribunal to hold a CMC, and the matters for the Tribunal to address in a CMC are set out in s. 33(1) of *LPATA* as well as Rule 26.20 of the Tribunal's *Rules of Practice and Procedure* (the "*Rules*"). The Tribunal dealt with these enumerated matters to the extent possible during the course of this CMC, though it became apparent that some matters will need to be addressed by additional submissions from the parties, and potentially by motion, as will be discussed below.

PARTIES AND PARTICIPANTS

[4] CAMPP, 386, and Fanelli (the "Appellants"), and the City are statutory parties to the appeals in accordance with s. 40 of *LPATA*. Pursuant to that same section, any others seeking status in the appeals are required to file written submissions at least 30 days before the CMC, indicating whether the decision under appeal is inconsistent with provincial policy or does not conform with an applicable provincial or official plan. In addition, Rule 26.19 of the Tribunal's *Rules* require such a submission to explain the nature of the requester's interest in the matter and how their participation will assist the Tribunal in determining the issues in the proceeding.

[5] In this case, the deadline to file written submissions was Tuesday, February 19, 2019. The Tribunal received one request for party status and 28 requests for participant status prior to the statutory deadline. The Tribunal also received one request for participant status after the deadline. These requests are dealt with in turn below.

Request for Party Status: Windsor Regional Hospital

[6] The sole request for party status was made by the applicant, Windsor Regional Hospital ("WRH"). CAMPP disputed WRH's request for party status, on the basis that

WRH is advancing the same position as the City, that is, that OPA 120 is consistent with the Provincial Policy Statement, 2014 (the "PPS"), and the ZBA is consistent with the PPS and conforms with the City's Official Plan. For the sake of brevity, the Tribunal's discussion and analysis below focuses on OPA 120 and the PPS.

[7] In Mr. Gillespie's submission, the wording of s. 40(1) of *LPATA* requires a written submission for party status to respect "whether the decision…was inconsistent with [the PPS]…or fails to conform with an applicable official plan." In other words, Mr. Gillespie argues that a written submission must address inconsistency with the PPS, and not consistency with the PPS.

[8] The Tribunal heard submissions from Ms. Bull on behalf of WRH describing the applicant's involvement in the planning process that lead to the adoption of OPA 120 and passing of the ZBA, which included the preparation and presentation of numerous background studies and reports that were available to the City when council made its decisions on the planning instruments. Ms. Bull also referred to s. 17(49.4) of the *Planning Act*, which allows the Tribunal to consider a revised OPA with consent of certain specified parties and includes the applicant as such a party. In her submission, it would be highly unusual and contrary to the *Planning Act* for the Tribunal to refuse the applicant party status. While Mr. Gillespie acknowledged that the applicant does have a role to play in the case of a settlement, he maintained the position that the applicant's written submission under s. 40(1) must address inconsistency, rather than consistency, with the PPS.

[9] Upon considering the submissions of counsel and reviewing the relevant provisions of *LPATA* and the *Planning Act*, the Tribunal determined that it would grant WRH's request for party status. In arriving at this determination, the Tribunal noted that the interpretation of s. 40(1) advanced by CAMPP ignores the implicit language of that subsection, which is that a written submission must be made respecting whether <u>or not</u> the decision under appeal is inconsistent with the PPS.

[10] To restrict a potential party to a position of inconsistency with the PPS is akin to

imposing a basis for appeal on that potential party. The *Bill 139* amendments to the *Planning Act* clearly require an appellant to advance the position, in a notice of appeal, that the decision under appeal is inconsistent with the PPS. Specifically, in an appeal under s. 17(36) of the *Planning Act*, s. 17(37)(b) requires a notice of appeal to "explain how the part of decision to which the notice of appeal relates is inconsistent with a policy statement issued under subsection 3(1)" [emphasis added]. There is no parallel requirement in *LPATA* for a potential party to advance a position of inconsistency with the PPS. This is reflected in the difference in language in the *Planning Act*'s basis for appeal and notice of appeal requirements as compared to the language in s. 40(1) of *LPATA*, where a submission must respect "whether" the decision is inconsistent with the PPS. It is conceivable that a potential party, in answering the query in s. 40(1), will take the position that the decision is not inconsistent with the PPS.

[11] Further, the Tribunal could not reconcile CAMPP's interpretation of s. 40(1) with s. 17(49.4), which requires the applicant, as a specified party, to consent to a revised instrument being presented to the Tribunal. While this does not exempt an applicant from the requirement to file a written submission in accordance with s. 40(1) of *LPATA*, surely this subsection cannot be intended to operate in such a way that would exclude the applicant from its essential role in arriving at and presenting a revised instrument to the Tribunal under the *Planning Act.* The Tribunal must assume that these provisions of the *Planning Act* and *LPATA* are intended to work together.

[12] The Tribunal was satisfied, based on WRH's written submission, that it addressed the requirement set out in s. 40(1) of *LPATA*, as well as Tribunal Rule 26.19 to indicate how it would assist the Tribunal in determining the issues in the appeals. On that basis, the Tribunal granted WRH's request for party status.

Requests for Participant Status

[13] Of the 28 requests for participant status filed before the statutory deadline, the City disputed three requests, from: (1) Richard C. Spencer for RC Spencer Associates Inc.; (2) Ontario Association of Architects; and (3) Michigan Chapter of the Congress for

New Urbanism. Generally, the Tribunal understood the City's concerns to be that these groups or individuals do not have a direct interest in OPA 120 or the ZBA, and are not in a position to provide opinion evidence that is relevant to the Tribunal's determination of the issues in these appeals. The City also raised a concern that there could be a conflict of interest with one of the representatives of the Ontario Association of Architects; however, it was clarified during the CMC that another individual would speak on behalf of this group. This resolved the City's concern with respect to conflict.

[14] The Tribunal reviewed all 28 requests for participant status prior to the CMC and found that each one met the requirements of s. 40(1) of *LPATA*. The Tribunal therefore granted participant status to the groups and individuals listed on Attachment 1.

[15] The Tribunal also notes that, in accordance with s. 42(1) of *LPATA*, should the Tribunal hold an oral hearing for these appeals, only the parties may participate in that hearing. This means that unless the Tribunal determines that it needs to call a participant in order to ask questions about their written submission, then that written submission will form the extent of their participation in an oral hearing. Regardless, any participant or interested person is welcome to attend and observe an oral hearing.

[16] One request for participant status, from Walpole Island First Nation, was filed on February 22, 2019, after the statutory deadline of February 19, 2019. The Tribunal invited the writer of the submission or a representative to speak to the submission, however, it appeared that no one was in attendance at the CMC to do so. Beth Ann Cook, who was granted participant status based on her individual submission, addressed the Tribunal to confirm that the writer of the submission was not in attendance and that she is not the authorized representative.

[17] The Tribunal invited counsel for the parties to make submissions regarding the Tribunal's jurisdiction respecting a written submission filed after the statutory deadline. Mr. Gross submitted that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to accept a late submission, while Mr. Gillespie suggested that the Tribunal could convene a second CMC and direct that Walpole Island First Nation re-file its submission at least 30 days prior to that

second CMC. The Tribunal indicated that it would carefully consider that suggestion within the necessary statutory context, and it now provides its disposition here.

[18] The Tribunal has discretion to convene CMCs for appeals in which they are not otherwise required by *LPATA*, and also has discretion to convene multiple CMCs in any given appeal. However, for the *Planning Act* appeals in which *LPATA* does require a CMC, the Tribunal interprets s. 39(1) to require only one CMC that is mandatory:

> **Mandatory case management conference**
> **39** (1) The Tribunal shall, upon receipt of the record of appeal, direct the appellant and the municipality or approval authority whose decision or failure to make a decision is being appealed to participate in a case management conference under subsection 33 (1).

[19] Subsection 40(2) then ties the date of submission of a written request for status to that CMC:

> **Participation by other persons, subs. 38 (1)**
> **40** (1) If a person other than the appellant or the municipality or approval authority whose decision or failure to make a decision is being appealed wishes to participate in an appeal described in subsection 38 (1), the person must make a written submission to the Tribunal respecting whether the decision or failure to make a decision,
> (a) was inconsistent with a policy statement issued under subsection 3 (1) of the *Planning Act*;
> (b) fails to conform with or conflicts with a provincial plan; or
> (c) fails to conform with an applicable official plan.
>
> **Time for submission**
> (2) The submission must be made to the Tribunal at least 30 days before the date of the case management conference.

Both s. 39(1) and 40(2) refer to a singular CMC, which, when read together, the Tribunal interprets to be the mandatory CMC.

[20] Therefore, it follows that in this case, this first CMC is the mandatory CMC for the purpose of s. 39(1) and 40(2). Any requests for status must have been filed at least 30 days prior to the mandatory CMC in order to be considered. Given that the Tribunal has now held and concluded the mandatory CMC in these appeals, the window for written submissions closed 30 days prior to the CMC, on February 19, 2019.

[21] Even if the Tribunal were to accept Mr. Gillespie's solution, there would be no ability for the Tribunal to restrict its direction to one particular individual or group seeking status. Conceivably, this would mean that the Tribunal could be considering numerous submissions for status prior to a second CMC, in addition to the wave of submissions received for the first CMC. Such a result does not accord with the overall intent of the practices and procedures in *LPATA* to make the hearing process more efficient.

[22] The Tribunal finds that it does not have jurisdiction to grant participant status to Walpole Island First Nation, given that the submission was filed after the statutory deadline. The Tribunal does, however, note that the submission raised issues relating to consultation with First Nations, and that these issues are also raised by CAMPP in its appeals, and by Ms. Cook in her written submission. Should the Tribunal have any questions with respect to this issue, it may exercise its authority under s. 33(2) of *LPATA* to call a representative from Walpole Island First Nation for examination by the Tribunal.

ISSUES FOR THE HEARING

[23] The Tribunal canvassed counsel as to whether they had prepared or discussed preparation of a consolidated issues list. They had not, and Mr. Gillespie indicated that, given the relatively new CMC process, counsel were unsure as to whether this is required. The Tribunal explained that it is immensely helpful to the Tribunal to have a draft consolidated issues list prepared for the CMC in order to clearly identify which issues remain in dispute among the parties, and also to assist the Tribunal in determining the format of the hearing of the appeals. While the Tribunal's *Rules* require the statutory parties to set out the issues in their case synopses, the Tribunal anticipates that there will be ongoing refinement of the issues based on a party's reflection on another party's case synopsis, and on discussions among the parties prior to a CMC. This expectation is contained in Rule 26.20(d) whereby at a CMC, the Tribunal shall "identify, define or narrow the issues raised in the appeal."

[24] It is critical for the Tribunal to have a clear understanding of the issues in dispute

in order to determine the appropriate format for the hearing, and, more specifically, whether it needs to examine any witnesses at an oral hearing. Accordingly, the Tribunal directed the parties to submit a consolidated issues list within one week of the CMC.

[25] Within that timeline, the parties indicated to the Tribunal's case coordinator that, regrettably, they could not agree on a consolidated issues list. The Tribunal therefore received a proposed issues list from each of the Appellants, as well as a response from the City to each issues list with its own proposed wording and framing for many issues. WRH indicated that it supported the position of the City with respect to the issues list of the Appellants. Mr. Gillespie indicated, on behalf of CAMPP, that he would like an opportunity to address the Tribunal with respect to the issues list. It is unclear whether 386 or Fanelli dispute the City's proposed wording of their respective issues.

[26] There is no doubt that the new legislative scheme established through *LPATA* allows and even encourages the Tribunal to define the issues in these appeals. However, given the magnitude of OPA 120, the breadth of issues raised with respect to the PPS, and the nature of disagreement between at least some of the parties with respect to the issues, the Tribunal finds that the most fair and efficient approach is to provide direction with respect to the issues list and to allow the parties limited additional time to arrive at a consolidated list. Failing that, the Tribunal will direct the Appellant(s) to file motions in writing so that the Tribunal may finalize the issues list. In order to assist the parties in continuing to work toward a consolidated issues list, the Tribunal will offer direction with respect to its expectations regarding the issues list.

[27] In defining the issues in these appeals, the necessary starting point is the Tribunal's mandate and authority under the *Planning Act*. The *Planning Act*, as amended by *Bill 139*, establishes clear parameters in this regard. With respect to OPA 120, the Tribunal's powers are set out in s. 17(49.1) and (49.3). Generally, the Tribunal is required to dismiss the appeals unless the Tribunal determines that the part of a decision that is under appeal is inconsistent with the PPS, conflicts with or fails to conform with an applicable provincial plan, or, in the case of a lower-tier municipality, fails to conform with an upper-tier official plan:

> **Powers of L.P.A.T. — appeals under subss. (24) and (36)**
> (49.1) Subject to subsections (49.3) to (49.9), after holding a hearing on an appeal under subsection (24) or (36), the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal.
> …
> **Refusal and notice to make new decision**
> (49.3) Unless subsection (49.4), (49.7) or (49.8) applies, if the Tribunal determines that a part of a decision to which a notice of appeal under subsection (24) or (36) relates is inconsistent with a policy statement issued under subsection 3 (1), fails to conform with or conflicts with a provincial plan or, in the case of the official plan of a lower-tier municipality, fails to conform with the upper-tier municipality's official plan,
> (a) the Tribunal shall refuse to approve that part of the plan; and
> (b) the Tribunal shall notify the clerk of the municipality that adopted the official plan that the municipality is being given an opportunity to make a new decision in respect of the matter. [Emphasis added].

[28] The Tribunal's powers are similarly defined with respect to the ZBA appeal, as set out in s. 34(26) and (26.2):

> **Powers of L.P.A.T.**
> (26) Subject to subsections (26.1) to (26.10) and (26.13), after holding a hearing on an appeal under subsection (11) or (19), the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal
> …
> **Same — appeal under subs. (19)**
> (26.2) Unless subsection (26.3), (26.8) or (26.9) applies, if, on an appeal under subsection (19), the Tribunal determines that a part of the by-law to which the notice of appeal relates is inconsistent with a policy statement issued under subsection 3 (1), fails to conform with or conflicts with a provincial plan or fails to conform with an applicable official plan,
> (a) the Tribunal shall repeal that part of the by-law; and
> (b) the Tribunal shall notify the clerk of the municipality that it is being given an opportunity to make a new decision in respect of the matter.

[29] Notably, both ss. 17(49.3) and 34(26.2) refer to the notice of appeal to define the part of the decision or by-law that is under appeal. It follows, then, as a first step, that the Appellants would refer to their respective notices of appeal in formulating an issues list. Such an exercise should entail scrutiny and a sharp focus on the parts of OPA 120 and the ZBA to which the notices of appeal relate. The Tribunal observes that this focus is lacking in the draft issues lists, and that clear identification of the specific policies, schedules, or provisions under appeal will assist greatly in ensuring a focussed and efficient hearing and disposition of the appeals.

[30] The Tribunal also notes that the City of Windsor is a single-tier municipality and is therefore not subject to an upper-tier official plan. There is also no applicable provincial plan. Accordingly, the Tribunal expects the issues list for the OPA 120

appeals to only address matters relating to consistency with the PPS.

[31] The Tribunal understands that CAMPP's proposed issues for its OPA 120 appeals reference conformity with the City's Official Plan in several instances by operation of policy 4.7 of the PPS. While the Tribunal is aware that policy 4.7 of the PPS refers to the local official plan as the most important vehicle for implementing the policies of the PPS, it does not logically follow that an amendment to that official plan should be expected to conform to the plan that is being amended. Should CAMPP wish to pursue this approach to the issues list, it will have an opportunity to do so by written motion.

[32] Regarding the ZBA appeal, to which CAMPP is the sole appellant, the Tribunal expects that CAMPP's issues list will focus on issues relating to consistency with the PPS and conformity with the Official Plan in accordance with s. 34(26.2) of the *Planning Act*.

[33] With these directions in mind, the Tribunal directs the parties to continue to work toward a consolidated issues list and to submit that list to the Tribunal within 15 days of the issuance of this decision. Should the parties be unable to agree on an issues list, the Appellant(s) are directed to bring a motion in writing in accordance with Rule 10 of the Tribunal's *Rules*. This decision, and more specifically, the 15th day following issuance of the decision, serves as notice to the moving party(ies) pursuant to Rule 10.03.

[34] In addition to the assistance that a consolidated issues list will provide in moving this matter forward to a hearing, the Tribunal finds that an agreed statement of facts and evidence among the parties will also assist the Tribunal in determining whether it needs to examine any witnesses at the hearing. To that end, and to allow sufficient time for necessary consultations among parties and experts, the Tribunal directs the parties to submit an agreed statement of facts and evidence within 45 days of the issuance of this decision.

MOTION BY 386

[35] 386 brought a motion returnable at the CMC to have its appeal heard separately from the CAMPP and Fanelli appeals. In Mr. McCullough's submission, 386's concerns with OPA 120 are specific to its own property and 386 takes no position on the proposed location for the hospital. 386 is therefore of the view that it will be expensive, inefficient, and onerous for its appeal to be heard with the more comprehensive appeal by CAMPP, which 386 believes will entail a lengthy and complex hearing process.

[36] The City opposed the motion, submitting that separating the 386 appeal will bifurcate the proceedings in such a way that will require the Tribunal to determine certain issues twice, and allows for potentially inconsistent results. In support of this submission, the City noted that 386 has raised similar issues to CAMPP with respect to the PPS.

[37] In considering the motion, the Tribunal first notes the flawed premise of 386's submission, that is, that the hearing of the appeals will be lengthy and complex. This submission disregards the practices and procedures required by LPATA to provide for a much more limited hearing process, where no party may adduce evidence or examine a witness, and only the parties may make submissions during an oral hearing.

[38] With respect to the substance of the appeals, the Tribunal agrees with the City that 386's notice of appeal and case synopsis allege inconsistencies with the PPS that overlap those put forward by CAMPP. On that basis alone, it does not make sense to separate the 386 appeal to be heard in its own proceeding. Such an approach would be inefficient and unnecessarily repetitive for the parties and the Tribunal. The Tribunal therefore denied the motion by 386.

HEARING AND WITNESSES

[39] During the course of the CMC, the Tribunal canvassed with counsel the possible hearing formats for these appeals. While all agreed that an oral hearing is most appropriate in these circumstances, there was disagreement as to whether the Tribunal

should examine any witnesses. There was no dispute that such determination is within the Tribunal's sole discretion.

[40] The Tribunal has determined that, based on the breadth and nature of the likely issues before it in this appeal, it requires the benefit of an oral hearing with submissions from the parties. The Tribunal will continue to reserve its decision respecting whether it will examine any witnesses at the hearing, as this determination is dependent on the Tribunal's review of the consolidated issues list and agreed statement of facts and evidence, as outlined above.

[41] The Tribunal also heard submissions from counsel regarding the implications of the stated case of the Tribunal that is currently before the Divisional Court (arising from the Tribunal's decision in *Canadian National Railway Company v Toronto (City*), 2018 CanLII 102206 (File No. PL180210)), which includes questions of law regarding the ability of parties to question witnesses called by the Tribunal. The stated case is scheduled to be heard by the Divisional Court on April 24-25, 2019. The parties agree that if the Tribunal determines that it will examine witnesses in these appeals, it is necessary to await the opinion of the Divisional Court on the stated questions, as these questions relate directly to the examination of witnesses.

[42] Following the finalization of the issues list and submission of the agreed statement of facts and evidence, the Tribunal will issue its decision respecting whether it will examine witnesses. If necessary, that decision will also address timing and scheduling implications based on the status of the stated case.

MEDIATION

[43] During a CMC, the Tribunal is required to discuss opportunities for settlement, including the possible use of mediation, pursuant to s. 39(2) of *LPATA*. While the Appellants indicated a willingness to participate in Tribunal-assisted mediation, the City and WRH expressed concern that mediation will be a futile exercise if CAMPP is focussed solely on the proposed location for the new hospital. The City was also

dubious as to the likelihood of success of mediation with 386 and Fanelli. It was clear to the Tribunal that the parties had not had detailed discussions regarding the possibility of mediation, and so the Tribunal encouraged them to continue such discussions. The Tribunal expects that finalization of the issues list may assist in this regard.

TIMELINE TO DISPOSE OF THE APPEAL

[44] These appeals are subject to the timelines prescribed in Ontario Regulation 102/18 made under *LPATA* (the “Regulation”), which is ten months. Due to the need to finalize an issues list and agreed statement of facts and evidence to ensure a focussed, fair, and efficient hearing, the Tribunal has determined that it is necessary to suspend the timeline in order to secure a fair and just determination of the appeals. The Tribunal will accordingly issue a Notice of Postponement by separate Order, indicating that the timeline to dispose of the appeal has been postponed as of the date of this CMC, and in accordance with s. 1(2)1.i. of the Regulation. The Tribunal’s next decision will address resumption of the timeline.

ORDER

[45] The directions set out in this decision are so ordered.

[46] This panel is seized subject to the Tribunal’s scheduling requirements. The Tribunal may be spoken to regarding the ongoing case management of this matter.

"S. Jacobs"

S. JACOBS
MEMBER

"K.J. Hussey"

K.J. HUSSEY
VICE-CHAIR

"S. Tousaw"

S. TOUSAW
MEMBER

If there is an attachment referred to in this document,
please visit www.elto.gov.on.ca to view the attachment in PDF format.

ATTACHMENT 1

Richard C. Spencer for RC Spencer Associates Inc.
Ontario Association of Architects (contact Adam Tracey)
Dee (Deborah) Sweet
Janice Campbell
Michigan Chapter of the Congress for New Urbanism (contact Adam Cook)
Krysta Glovasky Ridsdale
Lori Newton on behalf of Bike Windsor-Essex
Anne Beer
Arleen Deschamps
Beth Ann Cook
Carol Anne DelCol
Albert Kadri
Judith McCullough
Mary Elizabeth Menear
Michelle Oncea
Mohammad Siddiq Akbar
Margaret Reimer
Saralee and Frank O'Reilly
Cheryl Golden
Jaquie Krause
Lori Hill
Rita Haase
Robert Harris
Lorena Shepley on behalf of Voices Against Poverty
Shane Mitchell
Caroline Taylor
David Hanna
Jonathan Choquette